mirror of https://github.com/easzlab/kubeasz.git
289 lines
11 KiB
YAML
289 lines
11 KiB
YAML
---
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os_desktop_enable: false
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os_env_extra_user_paths: []
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os_auth_pw_max_age: 60
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os_auth_pw_min_age: 7 # discourage password cycling
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os_auth_retries: 5
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os_auth_lockout_time: 600 # 10min
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os_auth_timeout: 60
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os_auth_allow_homeless: false
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os_auth_pam_passwdqc_enable: true
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os_auth_pam_passwdqc_options: 'min=disabled,disabled,16,12,8' # used in RHEL6
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os_auth_pam_pwquality_options: 'try_first_pass retry=3 type=' # used in RHEL7
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os_auth_root_ttys: [console, tty1, tty2, tty3, tty4, tty5, tty6]
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os_chfn_restrict: ''
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# may contain: change_user
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os_security_users_allow: []
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# specify system accounts those login should not be disabled and password not changed
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os_ignore_users: ['vagrant', 'kitchen']
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os_security_kernel_enable_module_loading: true
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os_security_kernel_enable_core_dump: false
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os_security_suid_sgid_enforce: true
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# user-defined blacklist and whitelist
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os_security_suid_sgid_blacklist: []
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os_security_suid_sgid_whitelist: []
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# if this is true, remove any suid/sgid bits from files that were not in the whitelist
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os_security_suid_sgid_remove_from_unknown: false
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# remove packages with known issues
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os_security_packages_clean: true
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os_security_packages_list: ['xinetd', 'inetd', 'ypserv', 'telnet-server', 'rsh-server', 'prelink']
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# Allow interactive startup (rhel, centos)
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os_security_init_prompt: true
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# Require root password for single user mode. (rhel, centos)
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os_security_init_single: false
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# Apply ufw defaults
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ufw_manage_defaults: true
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# Empty variable disables IPT_SYSCTL in /etc/default/ufw
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# by default in Ubuntu it set to: /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
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# CAUTION
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# if you enable it - it'll overwrite /etc/sysctl.conf file, managed by hardening framework
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ufw_ipt_sysctl: ''
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# Default ufw variables
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ufw_default_input_policy: 'DROP'
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ufw_default_output_policy: 'ACCEPT'
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ufw_default_forward_policy: 'DROP'
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ufw_default_application_policy: 'SKIP'
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ufw_manage_builtins: 'no'
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ufw_ipt_modules: 'nf_conntrack_ftp nf_nat_ftp nf_conntrack_netbios_ns'
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sysctl_config:
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# Disable IPv4 traffic forwarding. | sysctl-01
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net.ipv4.ip_forward: 0
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# Disable IPv6 traffic forwarding. | sysctl-19
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net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding: 0
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# ignore RAs on Ipv6. | sysctl-25
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net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra: 0
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net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra: 0
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# Enable RFC-recommended source validation feature. | sysctl-02
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net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter: 1
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net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter: 1
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# Reduce the surface on SMURF attacks. | sysctl-04
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# Make sure to ignore ECHO broadcasts, which are only required in broad network analysis.
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net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts: 1
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# There is no reason to accept bogus error responses from ICMP, so ignore them instead. | sysctl-03
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net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses: 1
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# Limit the amount of traffic the system uses for ICMP. | sysctl-05
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net.ipv4.icmp_ratelimit: 100
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# Adjust the ICMP ratelimit to include ping, dst unreachable,
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# source quench, ime exceed, param problem, timestamp reply, information reply | sysctl-06
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net.ipv4.icmp_ratemask: 88089
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# Disable IPv6 | sysctl-18
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net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6: 1
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# Protect against wrapping sequence numbers at gigabit speeds | sysctl-07
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net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps: 0
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# Define restriction level for announcing the local source IP | sysctl-08
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net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore: 1
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# Define mode for sending replies in response to
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# received ARP requests that resolve local target IP addresses | sysctl-09
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net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_announce: 2
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# RFC 1337 fix F1 | sysctl-10
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net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337: 1
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# Send(router) or accept(host) RFC1620 shared media redirects | sysctl-12
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net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media: 1
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net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media: 1
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# Accepting source route can lead to malicious networking behavior,
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# so disable it if not needed. | sysctl-13
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net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route: 0
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net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route: 0
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# Accepting redirects can lead to malicious networking behavior, so disable
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# it if not needed. | sysctl-13 | sysctl-14 | sysctl-15 | sysctl-20
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net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects: 0
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net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects: 0
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net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects: 0
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net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects: 0
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net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects: 0
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net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects: 0
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# For non-routers: don't send redirects, these settings are 0 | sysctl-16
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net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects: 0
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net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects: 0
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# log martian packets | sysctl-17
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net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians: 1
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net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians: 1
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# ipv6 config
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# Disable acceptance of IPv6 router solicitations messages | sysctl-21
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net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations: 0
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# Disable Accept Router Preference from router advertisement | sysctl-22
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net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref: 0
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# Disable learning Prefix Information from router advertisement | sysctl-23
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net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo: 0
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# Disable learning Hop limit from router advertisement | sysctl-24
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net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr: 0
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# Disable IPv6 autoconfiguration | sysctl-26
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net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf: 0
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# Disable neighbor solicitations to send out per address | sysctl-27
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net.ipv6.conf.default.dad_transmits: 0
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# Assign one global unicast IPv6 addresses to each interface | sysctl-28
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net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses: 1
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# This settings controls how the kernel behaves towards module changes at
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# runtime. Setting to 1 will disable module loading at runtime.
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# Setting it to 0 is actually never supported. | sysctl-29
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# kernel.modules_disabled: 1
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# Magic Sysrq should be disabled, but can also be set to a safe value if so
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# desired for physical machines. It can allow a safe reboot if the system hangs
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# and is a 'cleaner' alternative to hitting the reset button. | sysctl-30
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# The following values are permitted:
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# * **0** - disable sysrq
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# * **1** - enable sysrq completely
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# * **>1** - bitmask of enabled sysrq functions:
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# * **2** - control of console logging level
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# * **4** - control of keyboard (SAK, unraw)
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# * **8** - debugging dumps of processes etc.
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# * **16** - sync command
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# * **32** - remount read-only
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# * **64** - signalling of processes (term, kill, oom-kill)
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# * **128** - reboot/poweroff
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# * **256** - nicing of all RT tasks
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kernel.sysrq: 0
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# Prevent core dumps with SUID. These are usually only
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# needed by developers and may contain sensitive information. | sysctl-31
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fs.suid_dumpable: 0
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# Virtual memory regions protection | sysctl-32
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kernel.randomize_va_space: 2
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kernel.core_uses_pid: 1
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# The PTRACE system is used for debugging. With it, a single user process
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# can attach to any other dumpable process owned by the same user. In the
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# case of malicious software, it is possible to use PTRACE to access
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# credentials that exist in memory (re-using existing SSH connections,
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# extracting GPG agent information, etc).
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#
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# A PTRACE scope of "0" is the more permissive mode. A scope of "1" limits
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# PTRACE only to direct child processes (e.g. "gdb name-of-program" and
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# "strace -f name-of-program" work, but gdb's "attach" and "strace -fp $PID"
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# do not). The PTRACE scope is ignored when a user has CAP_SYS_PTRACE, so
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# "sudo strace -fp $PID" will work as before. For more details see:
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# https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/Roadmap/KernelHardening#ptrace
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#
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# For applications launching crash handlers that need PTRACE, exceptions can
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# be registered by the debugee by declaring in the segfault handler
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# specifically which process will be using PTRACE on the debugee:
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# prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, debugger_pid, 0, 0, 0);
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#
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# In general, PTRACE is not needed for the average running Ubuntu system.
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# To that end, the default is to set the PTRACE scope to "1". This value
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# may not be appropriate for developers or servers with only admin accounts.
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# kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1
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kernel.yama.ptrace_scope: 1
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# Protect the zero page of memory from userspace mmap to prevent kernel
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# NULL-dereference attacks against potential future kernel security
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# vulnerabilities. (Added in kernel 2.6.23.)
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#
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# While this default is built into the Ubuntu kernel, there is no way to
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# restore the kernel default if the value is changed during runtime; for
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# example via package removal (e.g. wine, dosemu). Therefore, this value
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# is reset to the secure default each time the sysctl values are loaded.
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vm.mmap_min_addr: 65536
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# These settings eliminate an entire class of security vulnerability:
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# time-of-check-time-of-use cross-privilege attacks using guessable
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# filenames (generally seen as "/tmp file race" vulnerabilities).
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fs.protected_hardlinks: 1
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fs.protected_symlinks: 1
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# These settings are set to the maximum supported value in order to
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# improve ASLR effectiveness for mmap, at the cost of increased
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# address-space fragmentation. | Tail-1
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vm.mmap_rnd_bits: 32
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vm.mmap_rnd_compat_bits: 16
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# When an attacker is trying to exploit the local kernel, it is often
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# helpful to be able to examine where in memory the kernel, modules,
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# and data structures live. As such, kernel addresses should be treated
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# as sensitive information.
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#
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# Many files and interfaces contain these addresses (e.g. /proc/kallsyms,
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# /proc/modules, etc), and this setting can censor the addresses. A value
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# of "0" allows all users to see the kernel addresses. A value of "1"
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# limits visibility to the root user, and "2" blocks even the root user.
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#
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# Some off-the-shelf malware exploit kernel addresses exposed
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# via /proc/kallsyms so by not making these addresses easily available
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# we increase the cost of such attack some what; now such malware has
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# to check which kernel Tails is running and then fetch the corresponding
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# kernel address map from some external source. This is not hard,
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# but certainly not all malware has such functionality. | Tails-2
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kernel.kptr_restrict: 2
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# kexec is dangerous: it enables replacement of the running kernel. | Tails-3
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kernel.kexec_load_disabled: 1
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# Do not delete the following line or otherwise the playbook will fail
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# at task 'create a combined sysctl-dict if overwrites are defined'
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sysctl_overwrite:
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net.ipv4.ip_forward: 1
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net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables: 1
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net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables: 1
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net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-arptables: 1
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# disable unused filesystems
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os_unused_filesystems:
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- "cramfs"
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- "freevxfs"
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- "jffs2"
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- "hfs"
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- "hfsplus"
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- "squashfs"
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- "udf"
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- "vfat"
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# Obsolete network protocols that should be disabled
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# per CIS Oracle Linux 6 Benchmark (2016)
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- "tipc" # CIS 3.5.4
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- "sctp" # CIS 3.5.2
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- "dccp" # CIS 3.5.1
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- "rds" # CIS 3.5.3
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# whitelist for used filesystems
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os_filesystem_whitelist: []
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# Set to false to turn the role into a no-op. Useful when using
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# the Ansible role dependency mechanism.
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os_hardening_enabled: true
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# Set to false to disable installing and configuring auditd.
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os_auditd_enabled: false
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os_auditd_max_log_file_action: keep_logs
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# Set the SELinux state, can be either disabled, permissive, or enforcing.
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os_selinux_state: disabled
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# Set the SELinux polixy.
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os_selinux_policy: targeted
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hidepid_option: '2' # allowed values: 0, 1, 2
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proc_mnt_options: 'rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,hidepid={{ hidepid_option }}'
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